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Abstract 
We provide reasons why researchers of business and management who are interested in how 
institutions are related to organization would want to read and use the work of Mary Douglas. 
One of the central problems about which management and organization theorists still debate 
is the extent to which the structure of institutions and organizations determines the agency 
afforded to individuals. We show how Douglas makes space for a treatment of institutions 
that avoids the usual retreat to methodological individualism that characterises these debates. 
This holds out the promise of reinvigorating organisational analysis in a manner that is in step 
with calls for focusing on organization as a way of life and with calls for revisiting the 
classics. 
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Chapter objectives 
We present a way of ordering Mary Douglas’s thinking that demonstrates its continued 
relevance for institutional approaches to understanding organization. We extend the ways in 
which Douglas’s writing on institutions has been used for this purpose by considering how 
her notions of Grid-and-Group allowed her to develop critiques of rational agency and 
methodological individualism. 
The chapter discusses: 
• The limited manner in which the new institutionalists have so far made use of 
Douglas’s ideas and what is lost by persisting with this restricted reading 
• How the insistence that there is one rationality against which all others can be 
measured prevents institutional analysis from understanding its own cultural biases 
• How Douglas’s Grid-and-Group heuristic device avoids a retreat to methodological 
individualism and what is gained from using it 
• How Barnard’s organization theory is closer to Douglas’s understanding of a way of 
life than it is to any of the new institutionalists, whether in economics or sociology 
• One way to work through select texts from Douglas’s writing and proposes how to 
relate these texts to concepts and problems in organizational institutionalism 
Introduction 
 ‘In current institutional theory an institution is defined as a system of rules. Since 
the rules may arise spontaneously in response to a variety of problems, and perform 
many functions without any single overall objective, “institution” is to be 
distinguished from “organization” when that refers to a purposive arrangement for 
achieving a specific goal’ (Douglas, 2013a, p. 36). 
If one were asked to summarise in a single sentence the central concern in all of Mary 
Douglas’s scholarship it would be difficult to improve on the following: ‘[T]he relation 
between forms of association and the forms of moral judgment that ratify the former’ 
(Douglas as cited in Fardon, 1987, p. 4). The simplicity of this core argument belies the 
richness of Douglas’s oeuvre. Strongly influenced by the idea that classifications are social 
conventions (Durkheim & Mauss, [1903] 1963), Douglas (1986a) develops her own powerful 
theory of classification, one that has been picked up by scores of organizational scholars who 
study institutions. However, most of these scholars have only ever used her ideas 
superficially and largely in the absence of the broader theoretical edifice in which these 
emerge (for a discussion of this shortcoming see: Logue, Clegg, & Gray, 2016). In light of 
this, the purpose of this chapter is to expand the scope of how Douglas’s ideas might be used 
by organizational scholars interested in institutions. 
Margaret Mary was born on 25 March 1921 in San Remo and died on 16 May 2007 in 
London. She was raised by her mother’s parents after being sent to Devon at the age of five 
while her parents were stationed in Burma with the British civil service. Though it was 
common for children of civil servants in the Far East to be sent home at such a young age, 
this did affect Douglas in a variety of ways about which she would write throughout her life. 
Living with her grandparents she developed what she calls a ‘feeling for hierarchy’,1 after 
experiencing the ‘hierarchical home’ (Douglas, 2013b, p. 299). When her mother died in 
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1933, she and her sister were taken back into her father’s care and they were transferred to 
the Sacred Heart Convent in Roehampton. In this schooling system her ‘feeling’ for hierarchy 
was further intensified and the difference between life at home and life in the convent 
provided a stark contrast; implicit rules in the former, and explicit rules in the latter. 
At university, she choose to study Philosophy, Politics and Economics at Oxford and, 
following her graduation in 1942, she was mobilised into the Colonial Office as part of the 
war effort. Whilst on post, she met various anthropologists and through reading their work 
became increasingly interested in anthropology. She returned to Oxford in 1946 to study the 
subject at the same time as E. E. Evans-Pritchard had been appointed as Chair of Social 
Anthropology. In our chapter, we describe how Evans-Pritchard’s ideas would allow her to 
theorise the feeling for hierarchy she had developed intuitively in her earlier life. In 1949, as 
part of her doctoral study, Douglas went to the Belgian Congo to do fieldwork among the 
Lele of the Kasai. She moved to University College London in 1951, married James Douglas 
and in 1953 completed her doctorate. At UCL, where Daryll Forde was head of department, 
she first published work that was based on her African fieldwork, later extending her ideas 
into new areas, now publishing about food and consumption theory.  
Douglas remained at UCL until 1977, after which she moved to the United States. There she 
was Research Scholar and later Director of Research on Culture at the Russell Sage 
Foundation in New York. This facilitated her collaboration with political scientist Aaron 
Wildavsky on the topic of risk perceptions and environmentalism before she moved again for 
a joint appointment across Humanities and Religious Studies at Northwestern University in 
1981. At Northwestern, she returned to some of her earlier interests in religion and theology, 
whilst continuing to develop her ideas about hierarchy in new and interesting directions. She 
was a visiting professor at Yale and Princeton. Douglas left Northwestern in 1985 but 
continued to publish. She was awarded Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the 
British Empire in December 2006 shortly before her death. 
We do not aim to provide a précis that readers would use in place of Douglas’s original texts. 
Instead, we start with a discussion about how her ideas have been taken up by organizational 
scholars who study institutions, much in the same manner as a newcomer to the study of 
business and organizations might encounter her work. Next we discuss what is lost by not 
reading her work directly. We use this format so that we can provide a guide for how to 
approach Douglas’s ideas directly and so that we can point to secondary literature that might 
be relevant for studying institutions. Our aim in doing this is to build on Douglas’s legacy in 
the broadest way possible so that we can make room for new organizational research on 
institutions that will be inspired by her important contributions to the social sciences. By the 
same token we will avoid providing the customary list of ‘suggestions for future research’ 
because we want to reinforce the message that Douglas’s books should be consulted directly 
by anyone seeking inspiration. If, as Douglas argues, organizational actions are understood to 
be related to the correspondence of forms of association and forms of moral judgment then 
we hope our reader can see how Douglas provides us with a rich theory and method for better 
understanding the ethical tension between how organizations are and how they ought to be.  
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Why the new institutionalism has tried to do the thinking for us 
Why would someone studying the world of business and organizations be interested in 
institutions? If modern organizations emerge because magic, myths and superstition are 
increasingly replaced by processes of intellectualization and rationalization,2 then 
understanding how the rise and fall of different institutions has influenced the development of 
the modern world would help us better understand why organizations are the way they are. 
By extension, it could also help us understand why organizations are not different from how 
they are now or it could even help us work out how they might be different. We could simply 
say that understanding the institutionalised organization of life can help us make a difference 
(e.g. March & Olsen, 1984). Trying to understand these processes of rationalization better, 
Meyer & Rowan (1977) concluded that the formal organizational structures that sustain the 
coordination and control of activities of organizations arise in highly institutionalised 
contexts, as is evident in their incorporation of prevailing practices and procedures. This, in 
turn, increases the legitimacy and long-term survival of organizations, even if adopting these 
practices and procedures goes against the short-term efficacy of doing something else. They 
proposed that these rationalised myths arise in an institutional context alongside complex 
networks of social organization and exchange, which subsequently also support and sustain 
the diffusion of these myths. Since the publication of Meyer & Rowan’s (1977) landmark 
article there has been an ever-increasing interest amongst organizational scholars to 
understand the role of institutions in the world of business and organizations. 
In their introduction to the influential edited volume The new institutionalism in 
organizational analysis, DiMaggio & Powell (1991) sought amongst other things to 
differentiate this new institutionalism of organization theory and sociology from the new 
institutionalism of economics and public choice. They draw on two main arguments from 
Douglas’s book titled How Institutions Think (1986a).3 First, they build on her critique that 
the behavioural conventions of rational actors, on which economists and public choice 
theorists rely, are on their own too unstable and unsustainable to be the starting point and 
foundation for an institution. Her critique poses a series of questions that would be difficult 
for rational choice theorists to adequately answer. What prevents individuals from repeatedly 
misbehaving in a haphazard manner? What prevents an individual from altering a convention 
on a whim? And what prevents individuals from free riding? Douglas proposes that it is the 
relationship between behavioural conventions and cognitive conventions that can provide 
continuity and order and that under certain conditions, an institution can emerge out of this 
relationship.  
Second, in How Institutions Think, Douglas provides a theory which explains what the 
conditions for the emergence of an institution actually are, and, why understanding them is a 
necessary component for analysing the origins and continuity of any institution. Since 
individual people in Douglas’s theorisation do not determine the fit between conventions and 
the order of the universe, new institutionalists can follow her lead and exclude from their 
definition of institutions ‘any purely instrumental or provisional practical arrangement that is 
recognized as such’ (Douglas, 1986a, p. 46). Drawing on the ideas of both Émile Durkheim 
and Ludwik Fleck,4 Douglas encourages us to think of an institution as a ‘legitimized social 
grouping’, its legitimacy derived from its ‘fit with the nature of the universe’ (Douglas, 
1986a, p. 46). This analogy, between behavioural and cognitive conventions, on the one 
hand, and the natural order of the cosmos for a given group of people, on the other hand, is 
what Douglas means when she refers to a ‘naturalizing analogy’ (see: 1986a, pp. 48, 50, 52). 
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Institutional theorists after the publication of DiMaggio & Powell’s edited volume have 
demonstrated a strong preference for using only Douglas’s (1986a) How Institutions Think, 
usually in a perfunctory manner, failing to explore the full implications of what it means for 
an analogy to become naturalized in the manner she theorizes. This is unfortunate, since, as 
we argue in this chapter, there is more to Douglas’s thought in that particular book, and much 
more than that particular book on its own would reveal. One notable exception is a recent 
paper by Logue, Clegg & Gray (2016) that focuses on what Douglas’s core arguments can 
contribute to the theorizing of institutional logics. Next, we briefly introduce what 
institutional logics are, we summarise the advances that Logue et al. (2016) make using 
Douglas’s ideas and then we consider the broader contributions of How Institutions Think in 
order to identify just how much more we could glean from this book alone. 
Scholarship on institutional logics predominantly takes as its starting point the chapter by 
Friedland & Alford (1991) titled Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, Practices, and 
Institutional Contradictions published in the DiMaggio & Powell edited book that we 
mentioned above. In that chapter, Friedland & Alford (1991) argued that institutional logics 
are the symbolic and material patterns that organize the institutionalized social world and that 
these logics constitute ‘society as a potentially contradictory interinstitutional system’ 
(Friedland & Alford, 1991, p. 240), an idea that was later developed to provide a meta-theory 
of society which aims to explain ‘actors’ choices for sensemaking, the vocabulary they use to 
motivate action, and their sense of self and identity’ (Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012, 
p. 2).5 Like DiMaggio & Powell (1991), Friedland & Alford draw on Douglas’s critique of 
rational choice theory and her insistence on the importance of cognition but they also criticise 
Douglas for under-theorising the incompatibility of different institutions, attributing this 
lacuna to her concern with establishing ‘the basis of social solidarity in shared categories of 
knowledge’ (Friedland & Alford, 1991, p. 262 fn. 22). Boxing Douglas in the consensus 
category, within a consensus versus conflict dualism is, perhaps, too hasty. 
As Mary Douglas’s biographer, Richard Fardon (1999, pp. 210-211), tells us, How 
Institutions Think is only one side of the coin. Her essay on Cultural Bias (Douglas, 1978; 
1982b, pp. 183-254) is the other. In fact, if we start with yet another of her essays titled 
Passive Voice Theories in Religious Sociology (Douglas, 1982b, pp. 1-15) and couple this 
with Cultural Bias, what we start to see is that accountability is foundational for social 
solidarity and it provides the mechanism by which voluntary, intended agency is granted by 
everyone, collectively, to every individual. This mutually agreed form for individual 
responsibility is the flip side of the attribution of blame. 
Logue et al. (2016, p. 1602) remind us that the original conception of institutional logics that 
was developed by Friedland & Alford was centrally concerned ‘with how analogies ground 
new practices and narratives achieving naturalness’ but that ‘this insight has faded from more 
recent institutional work’. Although some organizational scholars have used analogies to 
study institutions (e.g. Cornelissen, Holt, & Zundel, 2011; Etzion & Ferraro, 2010), their 
accounts have been much narrower in their scope than Logue et al. (2016) suggest they could 
be if we follow Douglas instead. Where organizational scholars have so far treated analogies 
only based on representations-in-use (e.g. text, images, etc.), Douglas (1986a, p. 45) would 
urge us to consider analogies as foundational for institutions, ‘in reason and in nature’. In 
short, where organizational scholars have thus far merely treated analogies as discursive 
formations that accompany institutions, we think that organizational scholars could go further 
and study them as cosmologies on which all institutional life is founded. Importantly, this 
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expansion of representation beyond the bounds of the narrow psychologism of individual 
cognition is an invitation to explore how membership of social entities—in this instance, 
organizations—involves a consideration of actions that are not simply the enactment of 
schemas or logics. In short, Douglas is advocating a European social anthropology of 
institutions drawing on Durkheim and Mauss rather than a US cultural anthropology of 
institutions drawing on Boas and Benedict. While the former would take its object of study as 
the social collective itself, the latter has a tendency to reduce the social to an epiphenomenon 
of rules of behaviour as they apply to individuals. 
The Intellectual Antecedents of a Social Anthropology of Institutions 
The intellectual backdrop to what was happening in British anthropology before World War 
II can be conveniently caricatured as a struggle between Malinowski’s functionalism at the 
LSE and an emerging structuralism at Oxford (see Goody, 1995, pp. 68-76; Kuper, 1983, pp. 
66-93). Douglas went up to Oxford in 1939 to study as a member of the Society for Home 
Students (later St Anne’s College), which allowed her to attend lectures and tutorials across 
the university, including those given by Alfred Radcliffe-Brown who had been appointed to 
the foundational chair in social anthropology two years earlier. 
The attempt to establish a true “science of the social” at Oxford was self-consciously a 
rejection of the individualism of Malinowski’s Argonauts of the Western Pacific (1922). Here 
Malinowski aimed to show that the Trobriand Islanders had customs and laws that were 
entirely rational insofar as they met an individual’s need to make sense of their world. 
Describing it as a ‘classic of descriptive ethnography’ (1951, p. 93), Malinowski’s student 
Evans-Pritchard was nonetheless critical of this effort because it treats ‘only a part of social 
life for particular and limited problems of investigation, taking the rest into consideration 
only in so far as it is relevant to these problems’ (1951, p. 96); a kind of functional analysis 
that he similarly identifies in Margaret Mead’s Coming of Age in Samoa (1929). 
Between 1926 and 1938, Evans-Pritchard was doing fieldwork amongst the Azande in Sudan 
and the Nuer in Kenya. Unlike prior anthropologists, such as Malinowski, who studied much 
smaller, island populations in Oceania, Evans-Pritchard and his contemporaries who were 
studying African societies were confronted with the vast governmental systems of tribes and 
nations which colonial authorities were having trouble disciplining. The lack of centralised 
political institutions amongst the Nuer, for example, is one of the reasons that Evans-
Pritchard was led to abandon the Malinowskian mode of generalising from single societies 
and toward Radcliffe-Brown’s comparative approach. Evans-Pritchard and Fortes (see 
Goody, 1995, pp. 58-67), however, also departed from Radcliffe-Brown’s position by 
emphasising ‘the lineage as part of the system of political relationships, rather than as a mode 
of organizing personal relationships… [so that the] term “social structure” came to connote 
the structure of relationships between groups and, in Fortes’s work, offices, rather than 
between persons’ (Kuper, 1983, p. 86). Radcliffe-Brown and Evans-Pritchard also disagreed 
about whether anthropology was to be considered a science or part of the humanities. 
The ‘new paradigm’, as Kuper (1983, p. 84) has referred to it, thus ushered structuralism into 
British anthropology creating a rift between those who followed Malinowski at the LSE and 
those who followed the Oxford tradition established by Radcliffe-Brown and developed 
further by Evans-Pritchard and Meyer Fortes. Of course, it is worth noting that in spite of 
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their differences what both Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown were doing was constituted as 
the science of society, a commitment which many succeeding generations of cultural 
anthropologists would drop, thereby returning anthropology to the humanities. The new 
paradigm marked a shift from function to meaning. Structural analysis meant ‘the integration 
of abstractions from social life’ (Evans-Pritchard, 1951, p. 96). It was a shift from ‘the 
concrete, institution-based functionalism of Malinowski… [to] a sociological, structuralist 
position’ (Kuper, 1983, p. 97). This new British structuralism was later to be developed by 
Edmund Leach, Rodney Needham, and even later by Mary Douglas (Kuper, 1983, p. 169). 
Like Durkheim, Evans-Pritchard aimed to show that societies otherwise considered primitive 
are not irrational and plagued by superstition. Instead, the people in these societies follow a 
logic that makes sense to them, that is rational to them. If an anthropologist could understand 
their witchcraft, they could explain misfortune rather than treat peoples’ belief about it as 
irrational. In adopting a sociological position, anthropologists following Radcliffe-Brown 
took social facts, in Durkheim’s sense, to be central to understanding this system (Stocking, 
1984, 1995). Social life is analogous to organic life in so far as the function of a social 
institution is the correspondence between that institution and the conditions of the existence 
of the social. Institutions are situated within a social structure that is made up of individuals 
who are finitely connected into an integrated whole (see Evans-Pritchard, 1951, p. 54; 
Radcliffe-Brown, 1935, p. 394). 
Where Evans-Pritchard (1965, p. 111) parted ways with Durkheim is in believing that 
anthropology ‘deals with relations, not with origins and essences’ as Durkheim did. We now 
turn to Douglas’s (1980) book on Evans-Pritchard to show how she takes all of these 
different sociological elements in a direction that is particularly useful for investigating 
institutions. Evans-Pritchard was, of course, hugely influential in Douglas’s thinking, a 
personal friend of hers and an intellectual compass of sorts. Her book on Evans-Pritchard was 
written after both of the two influential books in which she synthesizes her ideas, Purity and 
Danger (1966) and Natural Symbols (1970), and must therefore be read as a retrospective 
account (Fardon, 1999, p. 33). According to Fardon (1999, p. 26), ‘at different stages in the 
development of her own thought Mary Douglas was able to turn back to Evans-Pritchard to 
experience again the recognition that he had been there before her in important respects’. 
Although her ‘interpretation of what was of value in Evans-Pritchard work… is one with 
which few will agree’ (Schneider, 1981, p. 721) and for some even ‘turns out to resemble 
Mary Douglas’ herself (Beidelman, 1980), we would suggest that Douglas’s work can be 
approached from a different point of view. 
Interestingly, the second chapter of her book on Evans-Pritchard focuses on ‘human mental 
faculties’ and can be seen as a restorative account of British and French psychology for the 
purposes of the sociology of knowledge. The former had failed ‘to develop a sociological 
dimension to their experimental thinking’ and the latter had failed to ‘benefit from the British 
methodological advances’ (Douglas, 1980, p. 28). Evans-Pritchard, she argues, shows us a 
way forward. What differentiates Evans-Pritchard from any other scholar focusing on ‘the 
power to suspend attention… was his confidence that the selective principles were to be 
found in social institutions’ (1980, p. 27). This was precisely the argument made by 
Durkheim and Mauss and Douglas tells us that Evans-Pritchard’s life can therefore be 
presented as a tribute to them.6 The focus on mental faculties might seem ridiculous were it 
not for this point which directs us to the relationship between cognition and institutions 
which Douglas herself would later come to tackle. 
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If philosopher Immanuel Kant was right that the mind could organize immediate experience, 
how can any knowledge system be explained without defaulting to a transcendental divinity 
or collapsing all explanation into the individual?7 Durkheim resolves the tension between 
classical empiricism and Kantian apriorism by rendering epistemology sociological. This was 
Durkheim’s great insight. His ingenious solution is summarised in the conclusion of a book 
Durkheim wrote with his nephew Marcel Mauss which aimed to demonstrate that primitive 
classifications are essentially no different from modern classifications: ‘they are systems of 
hierarchized notions’ and they ‘have a purely speculative purpose’ (Durkheim & Mauss, 
[1903] 1963, p. 81). Taking How Institutions Think as our starting point, we can start to see 
that Douglas picks up on Durkheim’s effort to understand pre-modern classification and she 
extends this to the modern world. What needs to be understood in any specific analysis is 
how a classificatory enterprise is matched with social requirements, ultimately producing the 
foundations of a sociological epistemology (Douglas, 1986a, pp. 62-63).  
Almost an entire century later, the problem that Evans-Pritchard poses about human mental 
faculties still haunts us. Psychologists, economists and rational theorists of all flavours still 
insist in various ways that there is one rationality against which all others can be measured. 
Ultimately, however, both institutions and organizations are epiphenomena of ongoing 
human habits and experience (cf. Dewey, 1922). But according to Kant’s formulation, 
experience is structured by a priori categories and intuition that comprise the necessary and 
universal basis for all knowledge. The link then must be that attention is controlled by 
principles that are derived from interests, which can only be constituted in society, not the 
individual mind.8 By attention, Evans-Pritchard probably meant something similar to what 
organizational institutionalists mean (e.g. Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, pp. 113-114), since he 
was in conversation with neurologists and psychologists such as Frederick Bartlett, Henry 
Head and Charles Sherrington. However, the mechanism Evans-Pritchard was proposing 
undermines the one the new institutionalists would inherit from psychology because it locates 
interests in society rather than the individual mind. Accordingly, the ‘contrast between 
primitives and ourselves is much exaggerated by pretending that we think scientifically all 
the time… [and to] prevent that error the proper method is to compare like with like, our 
everyday thought with their everyday thought’ (Douglas, 1980, p. 31).9  
What can be gleaned from Douglas’s interpretation of Evans-Pritchard’s ethnographic work 
that is helpful for understanding institutions? Douglas tells us that Evans-Pritchard was 
interested in how the things that the Azande and the Nuer do in moments of misfortune can 
be used to study accountability. Since misfortune must be explained somehow, people resort 
to systems that require them to either blame or accept responsibility. The movement from 
consciousness to action is thoroughly institutionalised and accordingly requires the 
invocation of existences and powers that differ from one system to another. 
Methodologically, the researcher traces this accountability as it surfaces. When institutions 
are guarded an ‘awesome cosmos’ is established and ‘the initial convention is buried’ 
(Douglas, 1999, p. xv). As Douglas says about Durkheim’s model, delusion is necessary and 
this entire setup creates the delusion that institutions confer certainty. The analyst who idly 
goes along with this implicit assumption fails to understand the process by which institutions 
are created and maintained. 
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Grid-and-Group 
 ‘It is easy to be scathing about whether communities divide into hierarchical 
groups, egalitarian groups, individualist groups: They do not, and no one ever said 
they do’ (Douglas, 1999, p. 225). 
In Purity and Danger (1966), Douglas built on the critique of ‘primitive mentality’ we have 
outlined above (Evans-Pritchard, 1934) and famously showed the universality of cognitive 
blocks on matter that is ‘out of place’. She showed that rituals of cleanliness in contemporary 
households are underwritten by classification in much the same way as rituals related to 
defilement in societies described as primitive. In other words, from the point of view of 
studying social controls on institutionalised classification, there is no difference between 
primitive and contemporary societies. All institutions and organizations impose a 
classificatory order but the specific classifications in each do vary. What was missing was a 
parsimonious tool with which comparisons can be made. This new problem enters Douglas’s 
repertoire in conversation with the work of sociologist of education Basil Bernstein. 
Douglas took inspiration from a paper delivered by Bernstein at the London Institute of 
Education, titled ‘Ritual in education’. Bernstein’s argument was that speech acts were not 
psychologically determined but rather that forms of speech are subjected to controls on social 
position and social individualisation. He had developed a model for understanding cultural 
transmission that struck a chord for Douglas because it lent credence to the argument that one 
did not need to go and study remote peoples to learn about what it means to be human. It also 
promised to introduce a potential dynamism to her earlier model. Thus, after meeting 
Bernstein, Douglas proceeded to apply his ideas about ‘speech, thought and social structure 
to the study of religion’ (Douglas, 2001, p. 113), thus updating her earlier work on 
purification. Starting with Natural Symbols (1970), which was a product, at least in part, of 
many discussions with Bernstein, she began to revise one of the central theses of Purity and 
Danger. Bernstein urged her to consider those people who can go on with few concerns about 
matter that is out of place; where do they belong? This is when she starts to differentiate 
classification systems. 
In this work we start to see that values, the division of labour and social organization are 
differently upheld depending on the culture that produced them as classification systems. 
Throughout different editions of the book, features of this ‘grid-group’ typology as she would 
eventually call it, draw inspiration from different aspects of Bernstein’s work. What ties them 
together however is the work of Durkheim, especially his book on suicide (Durkheim, 1951). 
The common influence can be summarized as follows: ‘different forms of suicide are the 
products of different degrees of group regulation (or constraint) and group bonding (or 
affection)’ (Richards, 2008, p. 406). As its name suggests, the grid-group schematic has two 
dimensions for grounding ideation in social life. Fardon summarises how these appeared in 
the first edition of Natural Symbols: 
‘The first of these, “group” – the experience of a bounded social unit – …is 
prerequisite to the classic instance of the Durkheimian hypothesis in which 
society is expressed through ritual… [G]roup is independent of the second 
variable, which Douglas calls “grid”… On this first definition, grid consists 
of “rules which relate one person to others on an ego-centred basis” 
(Douglas, 1970, p. viii, as cited)… Group evokes boundary, an enclosing 
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circle; grid may either picture the individual as a nodal point from which 
relations radiate, or else place the individual within a “cross-hatching” of 
rules, distinctions and regulations. The thought of individuals grounded in 
these social dimensions is channelled into the “grooves” worn by the 
thoughts of previous residents of the same institutional space. The formal 
characteristics of both the “thought-style” and the institutional space within 
which it arises are similar’ (Fardon, 1999, p. 111). 
This sets up three conditions: group and grid, so that boundaries and internal order are well 
established; group not grid, so that boundaries are rigid but there is internal disarray; and, 
grid not group, so that ego-centred networks prevail. In the second edition of the book, 
Douglas extends this. Justification for a system of knowledge is given by a cosmology, which 
elaborates principles and the associated conduct that follows.10 The group dimension had to 
be enlarged to accommodate for the kinds of demands that Bernstein saw were being placed 
on students: ‘[t]he difference between strong boundary maintenance and weak boundary 
maintenance in education is analogous to the difference between ritual and anti-ritual in types 
of religion’ (Douglas, 1996a, p. ix). This extends the central thesis of Purity and Danger in 
new and interesting ways, as Douglas explains in one of her many acknowledgements to 
Bernstein:11 
‘… in that study I emphasized the communication function of all boundings 
of experience, without facing the empirical fact that some societies persist 
very well without strongly bounded cognitive categories and some tolerate 
anomaly more easily than others. Natural Symbols is an attempt to answer 
questions raised by myself from the programme of the earlier book’ 
(Douglas, 1996a, p. ix). 
These changes maintain parsimony in the schema while introducing many new explanatory 
dimensions to it, including not least the capacity to place societies in more than one quadrant 
and a dynamism that accounts for different lengths of time. In sum, as we tend toward a 
system of shared classifications (up on the vertical axis) it becomes increasingly possible to 
exercise control through classification. As we tend toward the origin and toward private 
classification, the associated control also changes (either through brute force or strong 
personal relationships). The ego with respect to others (the horizontal axis) varies according 
to whether control is being exercised against others (left) or by others (right). In other words, 
control is not the same concept in all locations of the schema. 
In this diagram (see Figure 1), Douglas is clear that she is reducing, re-arranging and adding 
to Bernstein’s model but that ultimately she is returning to the intentions behind it. It is a 
model for ‘deriving cosmology from control systems, or rather showing how cosmology is a 
part of the social bond, according to [three] principles’ (1996a, p. 57): (1) the entire cosmos 
and the place of humans in it has to match up with the control system imposing it; (2) the 
medium of control (speech codes and rituals) interacts with the control system and (3), the 
coding of the medium matches up with the control system. The first of these principles, as 
Douglas notes, is attempting to address what Weber refers to as legitimation. When she 
combines this with the second and third principles, to produce the concepts of Grid-and-
Group, we have descriptive tools for addressing ‘the way that social pressures reach an 
individual and structure his consciousness’ (Douglas, 1996a, p. 86). 
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Figure 1: Grid-and-Group diagram, adapted from Douglas (1996a, p. 60) 
The Bernstein-Douglas diagrams had wide-ranging influence in many different circles, not 
least of which, amongst a group of scholars that sought to develop this line of work explicitly 
(Douglas, 1982a). What does the Grid-and-Group typology do? According to Fardon (1987, 
p. 5) it operationalises: ‘the correlations which should exist between types of social 
interactions and the moral and cognitive universes in which they took place. To each social 
environment there should be a corresponding world of ideas. “Cultural bias” would tally with 
social experience, and social experience could be represented in terms of the qualities of 
relationships and the boundedness of social networks’. For us the importance of Grid-and-
Group is not that it should be deployed blindly as a tool to classify human behaviour; rather it 
is a compelling illustration of the explanatory importance Douglas attaches to our 
membership of a particular social collective when considering how we try to rationalize our 
behaviour with respect to others deemed to be inside or outside that social collective. In a 
sense this is Douglas’s own attempt to deal with the familiar structure/agency dualism but in 
a way that makes space for a treatment of institutions that avoids a retreat to methodological 
individualism.  
Beyond Methodological Individualism and the Myth of the Rational Actor 
Melvin A. Eggers, the Chancellor of Syracuse University, wrote the foreword of How 
Institutions Think12 and in it he notes that the book is the product of five lectures which Mary 
Douglas gave as part of the Abrams Lecture series at Syracuse.13 The head of the lecture 
series planning committee was Guthrie S. Birkhead, Professor of Public Administration and 
Political Science and Dean of the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. The 
other members of the committee were the Vice Chancellor, the Dean of the School of 
Management, a Syracuse law professor, the Chairman of the University’s Board of Trustees 
and the President of the Exxon Education Foundation. That Douglas would be chosen by this 
committee is telling of not only who respected Douglas’s contributions to academic 
knowledge but also those whom Douglas was willing to engage with through her ideas.  
The lecture series was funded by the Exxon Education Foundation in memory of Frank W. 
Abrams who was Chairman of the Board of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey. 
Abrams is worth mentioning in this context because of his commitment to responsible and 
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professional management, which he believed could be achieved when ‘individual 
objectives... are identified with the common good’ (Abrams, 1951, p. 34). According to 
Swanson (2008, p. 235), Abrams’s call for executives to accept their responsibilities to 
society by adopting a professional attitude toward a wide variety of stakeholders has been 
credited with influencing the development of stakeholder theory and the role of executive 
leaders in corporate social responsibility. Abrams’s commitment to civic duty echoes a form 
of responsible management that one of his contemporaries, Chester Barnard, tried to develop 
throughout his career. Barnard made some of the most important contributions to our 
understanding of management and organizations to date (Perrow, 1986), but his work has 
largely fallen out of favour. Douglas saw similarities in this part of Barnard’s work with her 
own interests but identified major shortcomings in the way that one of Barnard’s central 
concerns had been interpreted by subsequent generations of economists and management 
scholars. She took them on and tried to vindicate Barnard. 
In the Spring of 1988, economist Oliver E. Williamson, who just over two decades later 
would become the recipient of the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory 
of Alfred Nobel, held a visiting post as Professor of Economics and Transamerica Professor 
of Business Administration at the University of California, Berkeley. As is often customary 
with such appointments, he was asked to convene an interdisciplinary seminar, the theme of 
which became Chester Barnard’s classic book The Functions of the Executive (1938). The 
contributions to this seminar were eventually published as a book titled Organization Theory: 
From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond (1990; expanded edition published in 
1995). Alongside contributors more easily identifiable as management scholars, such as 
James March, Dick Scott, Glenn Carroll and Jeff Pfeffer, Mary Douglas has a chapter titled 
Converging on Autonomy: Anthropology and Institutional Economics. It is the 1995 version 
we refer to, although it was also reproduced under the title Autonomy and Opportunism in her 
book, Risk and Blame: Essays in Cultural Theory (1992). 
Douglas’s focus on Barnard is, at first blush, rather unpromising, for what could such a 
venerable commentator possibly offer for today’s organizational researcher? According to 
Douglas, however, what Barnard was trying to achieve—an adequate theory of the 
interaction of individuals with the organization they work in—had largely eluded us for 
decades. Still, Barnard did offer a rudimentary theory that links the purposes of members of 
organizations with the purposes of their organizations. The problem for Douglas is that 
readers of Barnard’s work had relied on an economistic view of human agency that has 
achieved its most developed status in the transactions costs approach of Oliver Williamson.14 
As such, how homo economicus maintains his autonomy in an organization for them is matter 
of rational choice: i.e., establishing equilibrium between the utility of self-interested 
behaviour and the pursuit of collective goals. Doing so bespeaks a methodological 
individualism founded on an 18th century notion of autonomy that is still evident in 
economics and social theory alike where people rationally choose their ideas, unlike 
primitives who are bound by the stultifying effects of culture. Such interpretation went 
against the grain of Douglas’s critiques of rational agency and methodological individualism, 
which we introduced above. It also betrays Barnard’s original attack on homo economicus 
and his attempt to develop organization theory that is closer to Douglas’s understanding of a 
way of life than it is to any of the new institutionalists (cf. du Gay, 2015), whether in 
economics or sociology.15 
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Douglas contends that this attempt to relate the structure of individual goals to the 
organization is founded on impossibility. This starting point gets in the way of any attempt to 
relate the structure of individual goals to the goals of an organized social environment, such 
as an organization. It is a sleight of hand because it is based on something that cannot be 
known: the genuine desires of the actor. Nevertheless, maintaining the conceit that economic 
actors behave according to some internal rational calculus of cost has undeniably been very 
successful, at least in a performative sense. Thus, unacceptably high costs for a particular 
choice will make a rational being change his or her mind about the ordering of their goals vis-
à-vis those of the organization without the need to consider any social influences. In other 
words, it treats individuals' objectives as independent of those of other people or the 
organization. Indeed, the only environmental factors that need be considered are expressed 
through the price setting of the market; preferences arise mysteriously from within the 
individual (Wildavsky, 1987). In terms of classifying organization, the implications are stark 
in that we end up with Williamson’s binary choice of either hierarchy or market. Douglas, 
however, proposes a way of classifying organizations using an anthropological approach that 
relies on seeing them as systems of shared meaning that afford its members more or less 
autonomy while simultaneously defining what that autonomy consists in. 
This is where Grid-and-Group analysis comes into its own. Drawing on the work of her one 
time student, Gerald Mars, Douglas shows that different organizational arrangements are 
associated with alternative economies of reward and esteem. Although economists since 
Adam Smith have acknowledged that the esteem in which others hold us is part of the 
calculus of cost, this has been limited to economising around transactions and in this sense 
Williamson is simply following a venerable tradition. In contrast, Mars shows a parallel 
economy of personal utility can exist, based on four characteristic shared understandings of 
the interaction of opportunistic behaviour and mutual esteem. Importantly these play out 
across the dimensions of Grid-and-Group to capture the social environment that affects the 
relations between an organization’s members by mapping onto easily apprehensible notions 
of structure and boundary. While Group represents where the boundary between insiders and 
outsiders lies, Grid is a measure of the extent to which those on the inside have to interact 
with those on the outside insulated from those on the inside.  
An exemplary illustration of the Grid-and-Group typology in Natural Symbols (1973a) is 
David Bloor’s (1978) analysis of how the discipline of mathematics responds to cultural 
differences (see also: Barnes, 1983). Bloor looks at the organization of mathematics 
departments in 19th century Germany and shows that there is a correspondence between their 
institutional form, on the one hand, and the curriculum and their chosen research topics, on 
the other hand. Drawing on Lakatos’s (1963) study of the way in which German 
mathematical departments dealt with subsequent challenges to Euler’s formulae concerning 
complex polyhedra, Bloor shows how a group of people bound together by set of common 
intellectual principles deal with challenges to their world view. Much in the same way as 
Douglas looked at rituals of cleanliness or defilement, Bloor is able to show that organization 
corresponds to classification schemes.  
The key insight that Bloor takes from Douglas to establish this line of institutional reasoning 
is that members of social groups understand the world through the categories they derive 
from their shared intellectual and material resources. This is where institutions crash into the 
messy world of human experience and here the key question arises: what happens when 
members of the group encounter an anomaly (or what Lakatos called a “Monster”) that does 
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not neatly fall into one of the existing categories they use on a day-to-day basis? For Lakatos 
this was a polyhedron that did not accord with Euler’s formulae, which meant that the 
formulae themselves needed revision or the Monster had to be redefined. But what passes for 
a monster in nineteenth century geometry also goes for today’s organizations. For example, 
how do we classify forms of organization that are neither captured by the rigidities of formal 
bureaucracy nor by the anarchy of the unfettered market? This is a challenge for organization 
studies and other disciplines that are so wedded to this simple binary choice. Small and 
isolated groups of scholars who do not have the intellectual and material resources nor the 
autonomy associated with the great European and North American universities (i.e., low 
Grid/high Group) would have good reason to fear these monsters as abominations and avoid 
the challenges they pose to their comfortably simple view of the world (an act of Monster 
Barring, as Bloor puts it). In contrast, larger and better resourced groups of scholars—well-
credentialed members of the intellectual mainstream if you like—are much better placed to 
accommodate monsters simply by creating new sub-disciplines with suitably revised 
theoretical and empirical instruments. This is, nevertheless, still a conservative strategy of 
high Grid/high Group that attempts to control disruption to its intellectual worldview by 
containing the monster, rather than by embracing it (according to Bloor an act of Monster 
Adjustment or, perhaps more graphically, a practice of sweeping the problem under the 
carpet, as Douglas describes it). This is because the autonomy of Monster Adjusters is 
constrained by their membership of the very community that is the source of most of their 
privileges. The scholars who are most receptive to the challenges posed by an anomaly, 
however, are those who have both the material and intellectual resources and the autonomy 
(i.e., low Grid/low Group) to indulge in what Bloor calls Monster Embracing activity.  In this 
case the presence of an anomaly is not a threat to be ignored or closed down but is an 
opportunity for individuals to advance their career and enhance their status vis-à-vis other 
organizational scholars by proposing a new category of organization. Of course, if sufficient 
numbers come to accept this new formulation it becomes the new orthodoxy and effectively 
the institution has changed. 
Categories are developed to address organizational problems, problems that are the product 
of usually implicit institutional processes. Norms then emerge from organization. If we 
follow Bloor’s analysis of various forms of organizing which uses Douglas’s Grid-and-Group 
typology together with Douglas’s consideration of ritual, we can significantly expand the 
institutional analysis of categories from merely looking at vocabularies (Loewenstein, 
Ocasio, & Jones, 2012), or temporally protracted rituals (Tracey & Creed, 2017) and myths 
(Sewell, 2018), to capture the full anthropological richness of organizational experience. An 
institutional analysis of this sort would thus yield a noticeably enriched understanding of 
organizations and undoubtedly displace the overly determined individual extant institutional 
analysis inherits from the weakest assumptions of psychology and economics. 
Concluding Remarks: How institutions really think? 
 ‘Nearly the whole effort of British social anthropology … was developed under the 
assumption that organization results from the process of adapting categories of 
thought. When I write that common categories are the basis of the social bond, 
reviewing anthropologists castigate me for stating the obvious’ (Douglas, 1995, p. 
104). 
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The preface that Douglas wrote for How Institutions Think provides a good a place to finish 
for our purposes. Here she is upfront about her attack on ideas of human cognition that lack 
sociological awareness and on the weaknesses of institutional analysis in economics. Indeed, 
as she pointedly says, ‘Not just any busload or haphazard crowd of people deserves the name 
of society’ (Douglas, 1986a, p. 9). This much is consistent with the lessons that 
organizational institutionalists take from the book. But she then explains that the lectures 
from which the book is drawn repeat ideas she had already developed in her earlier work but 
in the book these are restated with the aim of shedding new light on them, clarifying them, 
making them more persuasive and refining their delivery. Douglas goes even further and 
suggests that there is an important link between How Institutions Think and her previous 
writing to date that responds to her critics. This link is repeated at various points throughout 
her work, reminding us that all her different books make incremental modifications to the 
others. In the table below we attempt (with an obvious sense of irony) to classify her advice 
and the advice of her critics and commentators to produce a rough guide on how to approach 
the relationship between different books (for elaborated versions of many of the same points, 
see: Fardon, 1987, 1999; Mamadouh, 1999). This is neither a complete bibliography of 
Douglas’s work, nor a definitive guide, it is just one way to work through select texts and 
relate them to concepts and problems in organizational institutionalism (see Figure 2). We 
present this as a thematic rather than strictly chronological approach to Douglas’s writings; 
something that is particularly important, as she was apt to draw heavily on previous work in 
complex ways. We look forward to seeing institutional analyses of organization that are 
centrally inspired by Douglas’s important ideas and hope that our discussion assists in 
achieving this objective. 
Title (Reference) A Description of the 
Contribution 









foundations. Points an 
accusing finger at 
professional blind 
spots and rooted 
resistance. A post hoc 
introduction or 
prolegomenon to Risk 
Acceptability. How 
Institutions Think is 
only one side of the 
coin. Her essay on 
Cultural Bias 
(Douglas, 1978; 
1982b, pp. 183-254) is 
the other. 
Develops a theoretical 
and logical anchoring 
that presents a coherent 
argument about the 
social control of 
cognition (for 
background and 
context, see: Douglas, 
2013b). Start with her 
essay titled Passive 
Voice Theories in 
Religious Sociology 
(Douglas, 1982b, pp. 1-
15) and couple this 
with Cultural Bias. 
Accountability is 
foundational for social 
solidarity and it 
provides the 
mechanism by which 
voluntary, intended 
agency is granted by 
everyone, collectively, 
An institutional theory 
that can interpret the 
multiple interactions 
that individuals have 
with the organization in 
which they work that 
relies on the actual 
experiences of humans 
instead of the now-
common abstractions 
that are too-often made 
about individuals (for 
an important critique of 
these abstractions, 
which has still not 
adequately been 
answered but would be 
if our propositions are 
developed, see: 
Willmott, 2011)  
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to every individual. 
This mutually agreed 
form for individual 
responsibility is the flip 
side of the attribution 
of blame. 
Implicit Meanings  
(Douglas, 1975) 
An introduction to 
Douglas’s thinking in 
three parts. 
Boundaries can be used 
forensically because 
they reveal how order 
is created 
The capacity to 
compare institutions 
across cultures without 
resorting to ethnocentric 
assumptions about 
individuals (a problem 





The allocation of 
responsibility for 
misfortune 





(on method and for a 
discussion about using 
risk see: Douglas, 1990) 
Thought Styles 
(Douglas, 1996b) 
Why different people 
reason differently in 
everyday life 
Purity and Danger  
(Douglas, 1966) 
An attempt to 
generalise from Africa 
to our own condition 
Classification in 
different societies as 
this relates to social 
conventions 
Case studies for: (1) 
understanding 
Douglas’s early 
formulation of the 
dynamics between 
classification and order; 
(2) how detailed 
descriptions of social 





A reader that 
reinforces the 
argument of Purity 
and Danger 
The Lele of the 
Kasai  
(Douglas, 1963) 
A collection of 
ethnographic writings 
from her fieldwork on 
the Lele that provides 
an analysis of their 
organizational form 
Natural Symbols  
(Douglas, 1970) 
Introduces Grid-and-





earlier theory of how 
social order and the 
behavioural/cognitive 
conventions cohere to 
make a world 
A primer for 
understanding how 
Grid-and-Group can be 
used as a heuristic 
device for analysing 
different kinds of 
cultural bias that would 
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A collection of essays 
that apply Douglas’s 
model to a wide range 
of topics 
analysis. A wide range 
of secondary sources 
can be read alongside 
this (e.g. Law, 1986; 
Thompson, Grendstad, 
& Selle, 1999; 




Extends the argument 
to consumption 
Risk Acceptability 
According to the 
Social Sciences  
(Douglas, 1986b) 
Extends the argument 
to judgments about 
risk. Risk 
Acceptability is and 
introduction to Risk 
and Culture (see also: 
Douglas, 2013a) 
Shows how the 
anthropological 
analysis of public 
beliefs can be extended 
to our own case. 
Risk and Culture  
(Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982)  
Risk and Blame 
(Douglas, 1992) 
Missing Persons  
(Douglas & Ney, 
1998) 
Her theory of 
personhood and 
agency (see important 
discussion by Munro, 
1997) 
Against the critique of 
reductionism and an 
oversocialised 
individual (cf. Wrong, 
1962) 
The criticism of the 
passive voice could 
easily be extended and 
applied to 
organizational 
institutionalism and all 
its variants In the Active Voice  
(Douglas, 1982b) 
A collection of older 
essays that impress the 
necessity of not 
treating humans as 
passive and 
impersonal objects 
Figure 2: A thematic presentation of Mary Douglas’s major works as they relate to the study 
of institutions.  
End-of-chapter exercises 
1. Think about the ways in which individuals are classified in and by organizations. 
How did these forms of classification come about? How does it affect the people who 
are classified in this way? Must we accept such classification or can we resist it? 
2. Carefully consider Douglas’s concepts of Grid and Group and think about how they 
might be used by you to understand your position in a social group and your 
relationship to others inside and outside the group. 
Pierides & Sewell – Douglas and Institutions | To be published in Management, Organizations and 




 Final draft – Please do not copy, cite or circulate without permission | Page 18 of 26 
3. If institutions are social constructions then, conceivably, there could be an infinite 
number of different ones yet so few alternatives seem to present themselves at any 
one time. Why do you think this is case? How can Douglas help us to answer this 
question? 
4. What alternatives are there to thinking of individuals as examples of Homo 
Economicus (i.e., the utility maximising, self-interested, rational actor)?  
Glossary 
Institution – Organizational studies refers to institutions as complex social forms that 
reproduce themselves. An organization is thus itself an institution but an organization’s 
members live across many others such the family, religions, the legal system, governments, 
etc. For institutionalism to be a meaningful contribution to our understanding of 
organizations, however, it must be able to explain how they emerge, endure, change, and are 
ultimately replaced. In this sense, institutional analysis focuses on how individuals create but 
are also constrained by things like organizational structures (e.g., bureaucratic hierarchy), 
systems of rules, and taken-for-granted ways of behaving.  
Rational actor – The idea of rational actor can be traced back to the origins of Western 
philosophy in ancient Greece but it is now most closely associated with a post-Enlightenment 
notion of humans who assess the costs and benefits of their action before making a decision. 
A variant of this in the limited circumstances of economic exchange is the rational, utility 
maximising, self-interested actor sometimes known as Homo Economicus. 
Methodological individualism - The claim that social phenomena are best explained by 
showing how they result from the actions of individuals.  In turn, those actions are best 
explained by developing an understanding of the specific intentional states that motivate the 
individual actors. As a form of atomism it is most closely associated with the work of Max 
Weber but it has become the dominant epistemological approach in many social science 
disciplines today, especially economics and social psychology. It stands in opposition to 
Emile Durkheim’s notion of methodological holism where social phenomena cannot easily be 
explained by reducing them to the actions of individuals. 
Social anthropology – An approach to the study of societies and cultures that focuses on the 
composition of social institutions and their interrelationships. 
Durkheim (1858-1917) – A prominent and influential French sociologist who sought to 
explain how and why societies were able to maintain their integrity in a modern world in 
which traditional sources maintaining coherence and stability such as magic and religion no 
longer held sway.  
Naturalization – A form of legitimization where a group tries to justify its preferred social 
arrangements by claiming they are a natural state of affairs. This may be strengthened  by 
claiming additional support from ostensibly scientific evidence. For example, evolutionary 
psychology legitimates prevailing social arrangements by claiming they are part of our 
inherited human nature. 
 
Pierides & Sewell – Douglas and Institutions | To be published in Management, Organizations and 




 Final draft – Please do not copy, cite or circulate without permission | Page 19 of 26 
1 Douglas (2013b, p. 15-36) describes this ‘feeling for hierarchy’ in a lecture she gives when she receives the 
Marianist award on 9 October 2001 to honour her as ‘a Roman Catholic whose work has made a major 
contribution to the intellectual life’. It is important to note that one of Douglas’s overall interests is in cultural 
bias, so rather than adopting a pro-hierarchical or anti-hierarchical attitude herself, she wants to understand 
what kind of culture leads to such attitudes. 
2 Max Weber borrows the term (Entzauberung) from Friedrich Schiller, to refer to the ‘disenchantment’ of the 
world, in a process of transformation from traditional to complex societies. He makes the analysis of this 
process one of the core problems he pursues throughout his work. 
3 DiMaggio’s own ideas about cultural entrepreneurship owe much to Mary Douglas’s early thinking about 
classification and framing (esp. Douglas, 1966, and the influence of Bernstein after this), as developed in her 
‘Mass Media and Mythology’ seminar at the NYU Institute for the Humanities (see acknowledgments in: 
DiMaggio, 1982, p. 49, also fn. 3 p. 35). 
4 Four important thinkers who set the way for How Institutions Think are named in the preface: anthropologists 
E. Evans-Pritchard and Claude Lévi-Strauss and sociologists Émile Durkehim, and Robert Merton. Douglas 
dedicates the book to Merton. These are all figures who are now often too hastily dismissed with the label 
‘functionalists’, a flippant charge which should not get the accuser off the hook from having to adequately 
engage with any of their primary texts (cf. Cummings et al., 2017; Hinings, Greenwood, & Meyer, 2018; 
Thornton, 2009). 
5 Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury (2012) who wrote the first textbook on institutional logics, titling it The 
Institutional Logics Perspective, essentially ignored both the importance of Douglas’s thought for Friedland & 
Alford’s (1991) conception of institutional logics and as Logue et al. (2016) argue, they and others ignored the 
importance of naturalising analogies for founding institutions. The literature on institutional logics has 
developed significantly since then and it has become highly differentiated, however the use of Douglas’s work 
in this literature, which is what concerns us here, remains superficial. 
6 And similarly as a tribute to Lévy-Bruhl and Halbwachs for sociologizing the mind. 
7 In this note, Douglas (1986a, pp. x-xi) gives us a personal insight into how she reconciles two incompatible 
problems: ‘My husband deserves a special tribute. When two problems seem insoluble, our long experience of 
domestic life has suggested an oblique approach. Instead of a head-on attack on each separate issue, one set of 
problems can be made to confront the other. This strategy, which produces new definitions of what has to be 
solved, gives the framework of this book’. 
8 If Evans-Pritchard’s work was to be held together as a sociological theory of knowledge, then Douglas 
maintains that there are three essays published in the Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts at the Egyptian University 
on the subjects of magic (Evans-Pritchard, 1933), comparison (Evans-Pritchard, 1934) and rationality (Evans-
Pritchard, 1936) which exemplify this. 
9 The symmetry which Evans-Pritchard sought to promote between logic (reason and rationality), pre-logic 
(Lévy-Bruhl) and non-logic (Pareto) seemingly foreshadows the later problems of the sociology of scientific 
knowledge; local realities are to be anchored in local systems of accountability (Douglas, 1980, p. 35). 
Scientific culture is just as mystical as any other culture. 
10 This move is analogous to the one Bernstein makes when he turns his attention from restricted and elaborate 
speech codes to curriculum and the transmission of culture (e.g. Bernstein, 1996). 
11 Douglas says that this second edition of Natural Symbols ‘shows up more obviously as the other side of 
[Bernstein’s] thesis’ (Douglas, 1996a, p. ix). What she means is that the relationship between ritual and 
restricted code in her work – that weak boundaries are associated with ritualism – is the reverse of what it is in 
Bernstein’s. In this edition, grid also changes so that it is ‘the scope and coherent articulation of a system of 
classification’ (Douglas, 1996a, p. 59) whilst maintaining Durkheim’s thesis that systems of classification are 
products of social relations. 
12 Eggers was an economist who received his PhD from Yale in 1950. 
13 A very similar foreword appears in other books that were published from this series (e.g. Calabresi, 1985; 
Coleman, 1982; Dahl, 1985; Hoffmann, 1981). Douglas also writes in her preface that some of the chapters 
were previously tested in other venues, including importantly a conference in memory of Nelson Goodman, 
the Hollingshead Lecture at Yale University, the American Sociological Association meeting and the ethics 
seminar series organized by the late Russell Hardin (editor of the journal Ethics at the time) at the University 
of Chicago. 
14 Careful readers of Douglas and Barnard will know that Douglas is using Barnard here as a linchpin to critique 
the institutional economists and not Barnard himself. This has the unfortunate effect of appearing as though 
she is overly critical of Barnard when in fact we believe that it is his interpreters that she sees as the real 
problem. 
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15 This passage in Douglas (2005, p. 95) reveals a certain kind of ethos that is not unlike what du Gay (2015) 
refers to as a classical stance in organization theory: ‘I see [hierarchy] as a spontaneously created and 
maintained inclusive system, organizing its internal tensions by balance and symmetry, and rich in resources 
for peace and reconciliation. I miss it when it is not there, and grieve when it falls into any of its besetting 
traps’. 
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